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On June 30, 2015, California governor Jerry Brown signed into law Senate Bill 277 (SB 277), 1 which abolished the state's personal belief exemption (PBE) to school immunization requirements. Like all states, California requires that children attending school be immunized. California's statute applies to both public and private daycares and schools and as of July 2015 requires immunization against ten preventable, dangerous diseases.
2 Before SB 277 was passed, the PBE allowed parents to send their children to school despite having declined some or all of the required vaccines. Initially, all that was required was signing a form expressing an objection to vaccination based on undefined personal beliefs.
PBE rates have gone up dramatically since 1994. In 1994, schools on average had 0.6 percent of kindergarten students claiming PBE; by 2009, the number was 2.3 percent.
3 By the 2013-2014 school year, schools, on average, had 3.15 percent of kindergarten students claiming PBE. 4 While these percentages may seem low, they are not evenly distributed: Some communities have much higher rates, and a recent research paper demonstrated that those communities were most vulnerable to outbreaks.
As of January 2014, following a bill passed in 2012, an informational requirement was imposed on the then-available exemption. Assembly Bill 2109 6 required parents to obtain the signature of a healthcare provider-broadly defined to include school nurses, certain naturopaths, and others, in addition to doctors of osteopathic medicine (DOs) and medical doctors (MDs)-attesting that the parents were given information about the risks of vaccine-preventable diseases before making the decision not to vaccinate their child. 7 This essentially constituted a requirement of informed refusal. 8 In the year following AB 2109, the percentage of PBEs in kindergarten decreased by 19 percent (from 3.15 percent to 2.54 percent), but the overall immunization rates went up only slightly. 9 During the hearings, Senator Richard Pan explained that experience from Washington State suggests that while their informed refusal law initially decreased the rate of PBE, that trend stalled. In other words, informed refusal laws do not sufficiently increase vaccination rates. 10 Under SB 277, children will only be able to attend school or daycare, public or private, if they either receive the immunizations required by law or obtain a medical exemption from the requirement from a licensed physician-meaning only MDs and DOs.
11 Children may also be conditionally accepted into a school or daycare program if they are in the process of completing a series of vaccinations. In other words, if parents wish to leave their children unvaccinated, absent ny applicant wishing to apply for an exemption should be required to undergo an 'informed refusal' process. Prior to receiving an exemption, applicants would meet with a health professional (e.g. public health officer, school nurse, or primary care provider) to discuss the relative risks and benefits of immunization and exemption. This interaction would need to be memorialized on a standardized form."). an acknowledged medical reason to do so, they cannot send them to school or daycare. They will, however, have a variety of other options available. These options include homeschooling their children on their own or in collaboration with a few other families, or participating in certain independent study programs offered by public schools. Opponents of the bill and critics of vaccines fought (and continue to fight) vigorously against SB 277, sometimes with disturbing tactics.
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12 One recurrent theme was that the bill is unconstitutional. This Essay does not address the claim that SB 277 violates the federal constitution, as this subject has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, and our jurisprudence is consistent in upholding school immunization requirements with no nonmedical exemptions. 13 Instead, I focus on the claim that the bill is unconstitutional under state law because it violates a child's right to access public education, which has been acknowledged by the California Supreme Court to be a fundamental societal interest.
14 Part I explains why Serrano v. Priest 15 and subsequent cases addressing Serrano's holding-in relation both to equal protection and to access to education-do not support the application of strict scrutiny to SB 277. In reality, Serrano has never been used to limit the state's ability to ensure the health and safety of children in schools; these are a precondition to education, and our jurisprudence treats them as such. Attempting to use Serrano to attack a health and safety requirement goes against both the letter of the ruling and its spirit.
Part II addresses the compelling interest test, showing that even if strict scrutiny were applied, SB 277 would meet the standard. Part III examines whether a right of unvaccinated children to access schools and daycare services would create an increased risk of outbreaks that puts others at risk, including those who cannot be vaccinated. This in turn could be construed as limiting medically exempt children's rightful access to education, by requiring such naturally vulnerable popula- In a set of cases that were heard by California's Supreme Court three times, plaintiffs challenged the financing of California's school system by claiming that discrimination based on wealth violated equal protection. In the initial case, the Supreme Court overturned the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, ruling that the state's financing system did, indeed, violate the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating based on wealth. The court emphasized that in instances of wealth-based discrimination, courts traditionally evaluate the existence of a fundamental interest, explaining that " [u] ntil the present time wealth classifications have been invalidated only in conjunction with a limited number of fundamental interests-rights of defendants in criminal cases . . . and voting rights." 16 The court found education to be such a fundamental interest.
17
The court went on to discuss the "indispensable role which education plays in the modern industrial state." 18 The Serrano court highlighted the importance of education, both to the individual and her participation in modern society and to society itself. 19 The court based its analysis, to a large extent, on a thorough legal review discussing the importance of education in modern society and offering compelling arguments in support of acknowledging education as a fundamental interest.
20
Serrano justifiably stands for the importance of education under California's constitutional law. But it is important to remember that the decision was made in the context of examining whether wealth was a suspect classification that justified applying strict scrutiny to the state's school financing system. In other words, the emphasis on education was raised not in the abstract-not to provide for strict scrutiny every time the state attempts to regulate schools-but to prevent the state from limiting access to education based on a suspect classification.
B. Post-Serrano Jurisprudence
What does subsequent jurisprudence teach us about Serrano? There are two ways in which it clearly does not support the argument that SB 277 is unconstitutional under Serrano. First, children intentionally unvaccinated do not constitute a suspect classification that may be entitled to strict scrutiny in the context of limiting access to education. Second, if anything, post-Serrano cases have upheld the state's ability to regulate the school environment for safety. They certainly do not, in any way, undermine it, as described below.
Although California's jurisprudence recognizes a broader set of classifications as deserving of special protection than does federal constitutional law -for example, despite the holding of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 21 at the federal level, wealth can still be a suspect classification in some contexts, as clarified in the second Serrano case 22 -not every distinction made by the state deserves application of strict scrutiny. That is not surprising. Most laws make some distinctions-including laws that may affect fundamental interests like education. For example, education laws traditionally distinguish by age. Fundamental interests are not absolute, and not every classification or distinction applied to them is problematic. As explained in Romer v. Evans:
[T]he equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons. Darces, although advocating a more flexible approach to equal protection analysis, nevertheless took pains to connect the classification with more traditional indicia of a suspect class-national origin and ancestry. According to the court:
We have thus far emphasized the reason appellant's children constitute a discrete minority-their inability to control their parents' conduct. Equally crucial to our holding is the fact that appellant's citizen children are classified on the basis of an immutable trait-they cannot forsake their birth into an undocumented family.
27
Both King and Darces considered access to the right to receive state financial benefits. In Darces, children were denied welfare benefits because their undocumented siblings were living in the same house. 28 The court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate this state action.
29 SB 277 opponents argue that the justification for strict scrutiny cited by the Darces court-that the children in question did not ask to be deprived of these benefits, but were suffering because of a choice made by their parents-applies with equal force to children who did not ask to be deprived of vaccinations and, by application of SB 277, an education.
Yet the King court rebuts this argument, by properly focusing the inquiry on whether the basis of the discrimination was an immutable characteristic. 30 In King, plaintiffs argued that the decision whether to place children with relatives-as opposed to placing them with unrelated families-should be subject to strict scruti- ny. 31 The court rejected the application of strict scrutiny, reasoning that foster care placement is not an immutable trait. As the excerpt above highlights, King emphasized that the court in Darces had applied strict scrutiny not only because children have no control over the choices of their parents-the argument cited by vaccine opponents-but also because discrimination was occurring on the basis of immutable characteristics. 32 Immutable characteristics were not present in the facts of the King case. 33 Similarly, the parental choice not to vaccinate has nothing to do with any immutable trait: It is a voluntary choice by the parents that is unconnected to anything resembling national origin or ancestry.
Even 37 Religious identity may be immutable, but behavior-especially harmful behavior-is not, even when it is motivated by religion.
Refusal to vaccinate is a choice that imposes risks on others, because unvaccinated children are themselves at much higher risk of contracting preventable diseases than vaccinated children. 38 Moreover, communities with lower rates of immunization are at much higher risk of outbreaks. 39 Behavior that imposes risks on others can and should be regulated. For example, the state can and does regulate one's ability to drink and drive; while you are free to drink, the state can penalize you if you drive while under the influence, because that behavior creates a risk. 40 You have the right to refuse treatment for tuberculosis, but the state may quarantine you as a consequence of the infection risk you pose to others-even though no one contests the fact that freedom from restraint is a fundamental interest.
41
In this context, parents who choose not to vaccinate are more like those who choose to drink and drive than they are those who are members of an ethnic group. They have no more claim of discrimination than does the Association Against Discriminating on the Basis of Alcohol Consumption (ADOBAC).
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If the parent wanted to send the child to school clearly ill, there is no argument that the school could prevent that, and the state can regulate to protect other children from the illness. This is not prevented by Serrano. Acting preemptively to prevent an attending child from falling ill-by requiring vaccination, which reduces the chances of illness by up to 97 percent (for two doses of MMR 43 )-is likewise permissible. We could even push the discussion further and highlight that Serrano generally does not cover behavioral choices. If parents wanted to send a child to school naked, the school could prevent that, even if there is no risk to others, and Serrano would not apply. Similarly, Serrano does not apply when parents want to send the children to school unvaccinated. While a minority of parents may have religious reasons to reject vaccination (the PBE covered religious exemptions as well), and religion is a suspect classification, the evidence is that most people who do not vaccinate do not base the decision on religious reasons. 44 A minority of those who reject vaccines may do so for religious reasons, but SB 277 does not target that minority; it is a neutral law of general applicability, and therefore constitutional under our federal First Amendment jurisprudence. 45 Existing jurisprudence thus teaches us that Serrano would not apply to the category of differing vaccination status, if there were such a category, under an equal protection heading. Nor would it prevent the state from imposing school immunization requirements-with no nonmedical exemption required.
Nonmedical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements and Associations With Geographic
Although education is a fundamental interest, it is not, and has never been, an unregulated sphere. California has an entire education code and regulates schools in many aspects. Post-Serrano cases naturally brought challenges against some of those regulations, testing the boundaries of the doctrine. I have found no case in which Serrano led to the striking down of a health and safety regulation. Regulations that further access to education and prevent disruption of education are usually upheld.
Most notably, in Montalvo v. Madera 46 a junior high school student attacked the validity of a school regulation limiting the length of his hair. The school justified the regulation as necessary to prevent disruption of education.
47
The court upheld the restriction, deferring to the school authorities' judgment. 48 Note that this regulation focuses on a limitation that is not connected to preservation of life or the prevention of immediate severe harm. Furthermore, it was not a state law enjoying the aura of legitimacy that being passed by a democratically elected legislature confers. Nonetheless, the regulation was upheld, and Serrano not applied, because school and state authorities may regulate schools to promote orderly conduct, health, and safety. This is exactly what school immunization requirements do.
The next relevant case ended in a settlement and was never published. One site explains it as follows: In 1999, several California organizations filed a school funding case, Williams v. State, in state superior court on behalf of a class of students attending substandard schools. The complaint cited inadequate, unsafe, and unhealthy facilities, a shortage of qualified teachers, missing libraries, a lack of instructional materials, and overcrowded schools that resulted in a staggered and shortened school year (together known as Concept 6). The state filed cross-claims against 18 school districts, but in 2000 plaintiffs won a motion to sever and stay proceedings on the cross-claims. 
49
In other words, these plaintiffs used Serrano to attack schools that were, inter alia, "unsafe, and unhealthy"-underscoring the importance of health and safety as a precondition to education. 50 Unsurprisingly, disease outbreaks also undermine education. During an outbreak, students who are not vaccinated (including children who cannot be vaccinated for legitimate medical reasons) are kept out of school, both for their own safety and to contain the outbreak. 51 Those students' educations are clearly interrupted. A classroom in which a large number of students are absent will not be able to conduct business as usual, especially as children come back and need to catch up, often at different times, requiring teacher attention and focus. Outbreaks also consume valuable resources, especially limited time from school administrators and nurses, who need to identify and track the students at risk. Because resources are finite, that time has to come from elsewhere, at the cost of other activities. If teachers fall ill, that can also disrupt education. Teachers, too, deserve better than to be sick and potentially harmed by preventable illnesses. Of course, the sick students themselves miss school. In addition, a child may die from such a disease, or be disabled in a way that prevents or limits their subsequent education. In other words, just as disease outbreaks impose costs and harms on public health officials and society 52 and divert resources from other important objectives, 53 they also impose costs on schools and disrupt education. As mentioned above, vaccination refusal increases the risk of outbreaks. There is abundant evidence that easier-to-obtain exemptions lead to lower vaccination rates 54 and that having fewer barriers to obtaining exemptions is connected with higher rates of preventable disease. 55 State exemption policies can directly affect the degree to which schools are protected against outbreaks, 56 and outbreaks directly impact education. The suggestion that Serrano limits the ability of the state to impose regulations aimed at preventing outbreaks goes against its spirit and goal, actually undermining the right to education rather than promoting it.
Although there are no California cases on point, a New York case examined the tension between the right to education and a requirement for vaccination. a time, moreover, when there was no current outbreak) violated the state's explicit constitutional right to an education. The court concluded that:
The right to attend the public schools of the state is necessarily subject to some restrictions and limitations in the interest of the public health. . . . If vaccination strongly tends to prevent the transmission or spread of this disease [smallpox], it logically follows that children may be refused admission to the public schools until they have been vaccinated. 58 In other words, if vaccination prevents and minimizes the risk of transmission of harmful diseases, it may be required as a condition of school attendance, because of the need to protect the health of other students.
59
The closest California case opponents could use would be Phipps v. Saddleback Valley Unified School District. 60 In this case, the court overturned a requirement that a child with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) be homeschooled. But the grounds for the court's decision to uphold a permanent injunction against the school district 61 did not involve a constitutional argument for access under Serrano. Rather, the decision rested on the lack of evidence for a risk of infection and examined the use of administrative discretion. It cannot stand for the proposition that risk of infection does not justify limiting access. In Phipps, no such risk was found. Finally, although not discussed explicitly in the decision, Phipps would be easily distinguished because having AIDS is, sadly, still an immutable characteristic, while being unvaccinated without medical justification is not. Parents of a child infected with AIDS cannot change their child's condition, as much as they would like to, since AIDS currently remains incurable. Just as race or ethnicity, a child and her family have no choice in the matter.
II. SB 277 WITHSTANDS THE COMPELLING INTEREST AND LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS REQUIREMENTS
Even if one assumes-and, as explained above, this would probably be erroneous-that SB 277 is subject to strict scrutiny, there is reason to think that it would meet that standard. The federal constitution almost certainly does not require holding school immunization laws to this standard, not even in relation to religious exemptions (The California Constitution's position on 58. In re Viemeister, 72 N.E. at 98. 59. And unlike SB 277, the New York law was upheld even without a medical exemption. This decision seems to be eminently justified. All the diseases we vaccinate against carry substantial risks, which far outweigh vaccines' small risks.
64 Schools are areas of high transmission, 65 and again, communities with low vaccination rates are at much higher risk of disease. 66 Minimizing the risks of these dangerous diseases to children in school and to those they may infect (for example, newborns or the elderly) is potentially a matter of life and death.
67 There are few interests stronger than that.
SB 277 creates a situation in which there is no nonmedical exemption from school immunization requirements. Is this a narrowly tailored solution? The vast majority of states offer a religious exemption, and many a PBE or "philosophical" exemption, alongside the requirement to vaccinate. Furthermore, a law with no "out," or a law without a nonmedical exemption, carries its own risks, as I have addressed elsewhere:
Absent an exemption, parents may resort to extreme measures. They may decide that the only way to avoid harming their children is to falsify records. With exemptions, unvaccinated children are known, and schools typically exclude them if there is an outbreak-something for which state laws provide. This exclusion in the face of an outbreak would not be possible if unvaccinated students are not accurately identified. If no personal belief exemptions were allowed, parents may vac- cinate their children and then use one of the untested, unsupported "detoxification" protocols suggested by antivaccine extremists. This process could be less than healthy for these children. Additionally, parents may decide to homeschool only out of concerns about vaccines, not out of desire, and maybe without being truly ready and able to do so. That would also not necessarily be in the child's best interest. 68 These concerns hold, but they do not make SB 277 unconstitutional. Nor do they even make it a fundamentally flawed option: No law is perfect, and statutes often have to be compared with the status quo. SB 277 is better than the existing, easily obtained exemption that led some communities to have unacceptably high rates of exemptions, and offers many important benefits, making it worthy of support. 69 In terms of constitutionality, the question is how narrowly the law should be tailored. If the goal is vaccination rates that are as high as possible, a policy with no exemptions is that which achieves the goal. 70 The highest vaccination rates in our country are in Mississippi, one of the few states without a nonmedical exemption. 71 And as mentioned above, higher vaccination rates mean fewer outbreaks. Mississippi has not had a case of measles in twenty years and had fifty-four cases of pertussis in 2014, with ten through August 8, 2015.
72 By contrast, California, with its relatively easy to obtain PBE, had 136 cases of measles from the end of 2014 through April 2015. 73 2014 and 3404 by August 2015. 74 Three infants died of pertussis in 2014 in California, and one has died as of June 2015. 75 Even accounting for the difference in population size between the two states, these are stark differences.
Certainly, easy to obtain exemptions lead to lower vaccination rates, which increase the risk of outbreaks. Ideally, one would be able to mathematically predict the level of difficulty in obtaining vaccination exemptions that would effectively prevent outbreaks, but we do not have that information; right now, we are operating with uncertainty. How broad an exemption is justified in order to prevent a death? And should it really be the courts' job to second-guess the legislature's risk assessment in such a situation of uncertainty? My view is no. Since there are no good criteria to determine what is appropriately "narrow" in these circumstances-since it depends on the value put on a life-the democratically elected legislature should have leeway to reflect in its policy the state's values.
In addition, as discussed in Part IV, SB 277 does leave parents with options. As such, it is narrowly tailored to the goal of removing the risk that unvaccinated children pose to their classmates: Unvaccinated children cannot congregate in ways that undermine herd immunity and increase the risk of outbreaks, but they have access to several respectable educational opportunities that the state offers. And rather than forcing parents to vaccinate, the state is preserving their right to leave their children unvaccinated-but requiring them to act to reduce the risk that decision poses to others.
III. WHOSE RIGHT TO ACCESS? SB 277 PROTECTS THE RIGHT OF ACCESS OF THOSE WHO CANNOT BE VACCINATED
Senator Ben Allen, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, raised another powerful argument against attacks on SB 277's constitutionality. 76 Senator Allen reminded the Committee what the result of easy-to-get PBEs is: schools with low vaccination rates. Such schools create real risks for children with medical contraindications, specifically those who cannot be vaccinated.
For example, in the struggle over SB 277, the father of seven-year-old Rhett Krawitt, a leukemia survivor who remained unprotected from some diseases, talked about the parents' reluctance and hesitation to send Rhett to school before he could be vaccinated again given the high rate of exemptions. 77 Rhett could not be vaccinated because of his cancer treatments and was very vulnerable to a preventable disease such as measles. In essence, easily obtained exemptions, by creating an environment more prone to outbreaks, make schools less safe for children such as Rhett-putting them directly at risk of preventable disease.
In that sense, an extremely loose exemption undermines access to school for those who cannot be vaccinated or for whom vaccines are not as effective for medical reasons. 78 The parents of such children-cancer survivors, children with transplants, children allergic to vaccine components-do not have a choice. They cannot vaccinate their children, who often are especially vulnerable to the risk of infection. Low vaccination rates undermine these children's right to access education; limiting or removing exemptions improves it.
The state has to choose between the current system, which allows open access to schools to unvaccinated children, and providing safe access to children who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons. Between these groups, it is the latter-the children with medical conditions that prevent vaccination-that is more similar to the groups California's constitution most clearly protects, those with immutable traits. The barrier to access is not of their making, and not one about which they have a choice. This is the group whose access should take priority and be granted special protection by the state and the courts.
Parents who choose not to vaccinate may be motivated by real fears about vaccines. But their fears tend to go against overwhelming scientific evidence. Protecting the access of those making counterevidentiary choices at the expense of access for those who do not actually have a choice is problematic. will see the choice as constrained and as a choice between two evils. It is still, however, a choice.
The same is true regarding the choice to follow school immunization requirements. Parents do have a choice: They can vaccinate, protecting their children against disease, following the state requirements. Or, if sufficiently hostile to the requirement, they can choose one of the available options. There are several choices available. Parents can choose to homeschool as a private school, by filing an affidavit, 83 alone or as part of a group of families (the statute was amended to allow a group of families to homeschool together). While hard for working parents, this decision can still be made feasible through the option of collaborating with other families. Or parents can hire an accredited tutor. 84 Or parents can enroll their children in an independent study program offered by a public school.
These options may be inconvenient or challenging for some families. They may feel constrained and unhappy about the choice. They may correctly see it as limiting their child's educational opportunity. They may see it as a choice between evils, as unbearably hard. But they do have a choice. They can choose to protect their child from disease and send that child to school, or they can choose to take advantage of one of the other options offered by the state.
The state does not change its curriculum to accommodate parents so hostile to it that they would rather homeschool; the state does not have to avoid reasonable health regulations, such as vaccination requirements, to accommodate parents so frightened of vaccination (usually based on incorrect information) 85 that they would rather homeschool.
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CONCLUSION
SB 277 generated substantial controversy. There can be legitimate debate on whether removing exemptions to school immunization requirements is appropriate from a policy standpoint, 87 but opponents claiming that the bill is un- 
